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ABSTRACT
Decoy Routing, the use of routers (rather than end hosts) as proxies,
is a new direction in anti-censorship research. Decoy Routers (DRs),
placed in Autonomous Systems, proxy traffic from users; so the
adversary, e.g. a censorious government, attempts to avoid them. It
is quite difficult to place DRs so the adversary cannot route around
them – for example, we need the cooperation of 850 ASes to contain
China alone [1].
In this paper, we consider a different approach. We begin by
noting that DRs need not intercept all the network paths from
a country, just those leading to Overt Destinations, i.e. unfiltered
websites hosted outside the country (usually popular ones, so that
client traffic to the OD does not make the censor suspicious). Our
first question is – How many ASes are required for installing DRs
to intercept a large fraction of paths from e.g. China to the top-
n websites (as per Alexa)? How does this number grow with n ?
To our surprise, the same few (≈ 30) ASes intercept over 90% of
paths to the top n sites worldwide, for n = 10, 20...200 and also to
other destinations. Investigating further, we find that this result fits
perfectly with the hierarchical model of the Internet [2]; our first
contribution is to demonstrate with real paths that the number of
ASes required for a world-wide DR framework is small (≈ 30). Further,
censor nations’ attempts to filter traffic along the paths transiting
these 30 ASes will not only block their own citizens, but others
residing in foreign ASes.
Our second contribution in this paper is to consider the details
of DR placement: not just in which ASes DRs should be placed to
intercept traffic, but exactly where in each AS. We find that even
with our small number of ASes, we still need a total of about 11, 700
DRs. We conclude that, even though a DR system involves far fewer
ASes than previously thought, it is still a major undertaking. For
example, the current routers cost over 10.3 billion USD, so if Decoy
Routing at line speed requires all-new hardware, the cost alone
would make such a project unfeasible for most actors (but not for
major nation states).
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1 INTRODUCTION
Anti-censorship systems such as proxies or Tor [3] suffer from
a double bind. To be useful, the entry point to the service must
be discoverable to the user – typically, the citizen of a censorious
country. On the other hand, as soon as the entry point becomes
common knowledge, it also comes to the attention of the censoring
government, who shuts it down [4]. Decoy Routing, a new anti-
censorship paradigm[5–10], attempts to disrupt this dynamic by
using special routers as proxies, rather than end hosts. A DR lies on
the path of traffic between the user inside a censorious country and
an apparent (“overt”) destination; when it senses secret handshake
data embedded in the user’s packets, it intercepts the packets and
re-sends the message they carry to the real (“covert”) destination.
Note that the DR, being outside the censorious country, can freely
communicate with the covert destination – and unlike an end-host
proxy, cannot easily be blacklisted.
However, “easy” is a relative term. In their paper on “Routing
around Decoys” [11], Schuchard et al. propose that a sufficiently
powerful adversary can simply route around ASes in the Internet
where DRs are positioned. Houmansadr et al. [1] retort that such
a move is extremely expensive, and in any case one could leave
the adversary with no such option, e.g. by placing DRs in enough
ASes to completely encircle a censorious country. They then follow
up with a model [12], where they frame the problem of placing
DRs, versus the problem of bypassing them, as an adversarial game.
But the problem remains that the best known solutions still require
the collaboration of several hundred ASes, in order to leave a single
well-connected country1 with no choice but to route through one of
them. Further, such solutions require the computation of separate
sets of ASes for each adversary nation [1, 12].
Our first contribution in this paper is a new approach to the ques-
tion of placing DRs. In Decoy Routing, the router interceptsmessages,
from the user inside a censorious nation, en route to an overt desti-
nation. What if, instead of trying to intercept all the flows from a
censorious country, we consider only the flows to the overt destina-
tions? The overt destination is most likely a well-known site, often
visited by citizens of the target country. [If not, it is very hard for
users to discover; and when it is found, the sudden surge of traffic
from users in China to some obscure website in e.g. Turkmenistan
will itself make the censor suspicious.]
As a first step, we started with the assumption that the overt
destinations are popular sites (such as the Alexa top-10). We con-
structed a map of AS-level paths, connecting all ASes of the Internet
1A “well-connected” country does not just refer to major powers like China; even e.g.
Venezuela is well-connected in this regard.
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to these, using the approach described by Gao et al. [13] (involving
real BGP routing tables and inter-AS relationships [14]). We then
identified the “key” ASes – those which appear most frequently on
a large fraction of the paths. We find that ≈ 30 ASes appear in more
than 90% of the paths to our target sites.
Our approach in this first step is not general; clearly, the ad-
versary could block access to the entire Alexa top-10, to prevent
users’ traffic from reaching the DRs. So our second step is a study
of how the “hardness” of the problem – finding the set of ASes that
intercept several AS paths – varies as we change the set of possible
overt destinations to the top-10, 20, 30, 50, 100, or 200 web sites.
Interestingly, we found the same set of 30 ASes intercept over
90% of paths in all cases – whether we consider paths leading to
the top-10, 20 ... or 200. However, this result is easy to explain
in hindsight. The Internet consists of ASes linked by peer-peer
and provider-customer relationships; the “top of the hierarchy” or
“core” consists of a few large multi-national ASes that peer with
one another, and provide Internet access to most other ASes [2, 15–
17]. Given such findings, and our experimental results with real
paths, we come to a very powerful conclusion: only 30 ASes, all
in non-censorious countries, are sufficient for a DR infrastructure
that intercepts more than 90% of paths to important websites in
general. In such a case, besides the reduction in the number of
ASes compared to current solutions (about 30 times) this method
needs to be run only once, rather than separately for each censorious
country. Our further experiments indicate that this is indeed the
case – the power of these ASes is not limited to the top-100 websites,
they intercept over 90% of paths for other destinations as well. For
example, with nine case studies of censorious countries, we found
that these key ASes also intercept over 90% of the paths to 450
websites that are popular across these nations and also hosted
outside their respective network boundaries.
Our AS-level results suggest that censorious countries in the
Internet are less able to “route around decoys” than previously
thought. About 30 ASes – 0.055% of the world ASes – intercept
over 90% of paths to popular websites, and in particular, 99% of the
paths originating from China. Furthermore, if censorious regimes
choose to filter traffic along paths traversing the key ASes, they
affect customers outside their network boundaries, and the extent of
this “collateral damage” can be extremely high – for example, over
92% of all the network paths that traverse Chinese ASes originate
beyond its network boundaries. (Details in section 6.)
For our second contribution in this paper, we raise a new question.
DR placement is not limited to AS selection! A large AS has thou-
sands of routers; where exactly in the AS should DRs be placed? In
this first study that uses intra-AS mapping (viz. Rocketfuel [18]) to
answer the aforementioned question, we find that while the number
of ASes required for a world-wide DR framework is very small (30),
we need to replace on average 400 routers per AS with DRs.
We conclude that, while a global DR system may involve only
30 ASes, a practical one would still require placing over 11, 700
DRs in about 13 different countries. In fact, the problem remains
challenging even if we provide Decoy Routing to citizens of a single
country: against a very weak adversary, Syria (contained by only 3
ASes), a DR framework would involve 1, 117 routers. No existing
DR architectures have been shown to process requests at line rates
of network backbone routers2, nor has an implementation on exist-
ing high-speed routers been developed. Unless we can deploy Decoy
Routing on existing (or augmented) networking infrastructure, and
can handle the high speeds, we will need to replace infrastructure
at costs of over ten billion dollars (for example, for Level-3 Commu-
nications alone, i.e. AS 3356 and AS 3549, the cost is 1.4 billion USD
at Parulkar and McKeown’s [20] estimate of 885, 000 USD/ router),
plus implementation, downtime, and debugging costs.
2 BACKGROUND AND RELATED RESEARCH
This section presents the relevant background for our work, and a
brief discussion of how it fits into the existing literature.
2.1 Network Anti-censorship and Decoy
Routing
The general area of our work is the use of proxy servers to cir-
cumvent censorship. Popular anti-censorship solutions, such as
Tor [3]3, are no longer powerful enough when the adversary is
a sophisticated nation-state: there exist techniques to detect TLS
flows carrying Tor [21, 22]. More generally, traffic for most proxy
based solutions can be detected and censored [23, 24], even if cam-
ouflaged [25].
Decoy Routing [5] takes a new direction where proxying is per-
formed by special network routers called Decoy Routers. We sketch
the basic mechanism in brief.
• The user of DR is hosted within a censorious ISP network,
but wishes to communicate with network destinations cen-
sored by its ISP. To achieve this, it sends packets addressed
to an innocuous-looking website, known as the overt desti-
nation. (The packets are encrypted using TLS, so the ISP
cannot see the contents, and the header shows that they
are meant for an unfiltered destination.)
• These innocuous-appearing packets, allowed out of the
censoring ISP, carry a small, steganographic message, usu-
ally encoded in the protocol headers.
• On their way to the overt destination, if the packets pass
through a DR, the steganographic message acts as a secret
handshake. Instead of forwarding them, the DR decrypts
their payload (the key, the TLS shared secret, is also sent as
part of the secret message); establishes a new connection
to the filtered site - the true, covert destination; and sends
the payload to this covert destination.
Thus, a DR acts as a proxy, covertly communicating with a blocked
site on behalf of the user. This procedure, end-to-middle (E2M)
censorship circumvention, is shown in Figure 1. Actual implemen-
tations of Decoy Routing – Telex [7], Cirripede [6], TapDance [8],
Rebound [9] and Slitheen [10] – have different features (message
replay protection, tolerance of asymmetry in routing, inline block-
ing of traffic to/from overt destination, implementation of secret
handshake, etc.), but share the basic design outlined above. This
design decision stems from the realization that it is much harder
for the censor to prevent the packets passing through a router, than
2Which is of the order of several Tbps [19]
3Onion routing was originally designed to ensure anonymity over the Internet, but
as it tunnels encrypted messages through a distributed network of proxies, it is also
suitable for evading censorship.
it is to block an end host. But how hard it really is for the censor
to circumvent DRs, and where the routers should be placed, is an
active research question, as we discuss in the next sub-section.
FirewallClient
to 
Internet
CD
OD
DR Station
Tagged Flow
DR
Figure 1: Decoy Routing in Action: Clients in a censori-
ous ISP bypass the filter by sending packets apparently ad-
dressed to a non-filtered overt destination (OD). En route,
the packets traverse a DR, which sees the secret message;
identifies them for special handling; decrypts them; and
sends their payload to the real, covert destination (CD).
[Note: Current implementations cannot perform Decoy
Routing with just the router, they also require a DR station -
typically a server - for the “heavy lifting”, involving crypto-
graphic operations]
2.2 On The Placement of DRs
Where should DRs be placed in the Internet? This question was
first raised by the Cirripede project [6], whose authors claim that
(against an adversary who is ignorant of Decoy Routing), placing
DRs in just two tier-1 ASes is sufficient to serve all clients world-
wide.
The next major step, by Schuchard et al. [11], is to suggest that a
powerful adversary such as China will eventually figure out which
ASes have DRs in them, and simply redirect its traffic to avoid
these ASes – the Routing Around Decoys (RAD) attack. Mapping
the Internet at AS level (ASes and their connections), the authors
show that censor countries (China, Iran, etc.) have connections to
many ASes, and thus enough alternative paths to route around a
particular AS. Avoiding the top 100 ASes (by degree in the CAIDA
connectivity graph) would disconnect China from only 2.3% of web
destinations.
Houmansadr et al. [1] counter that, once we consider actual
routing – with directional business relationships between ASes,
rather than just graph connectivity – the RAD attack is too costly
to be feasible. They also question Schuchard et al.’s assumption that
DRs may be placed in randomly-chosen ASes. 86.2% of the ASes
on the Internet are origin ASes (i.e. they do not transport traffic of
other ASes); a random placement mostly chooses such ASes, and it
is possible to do much better if the ASes are chosen strategically.
The authors propose two ways to do this:
(1) Sorted placement. ASes that appear most frequently in the
adversary’s routing tables.
(2) Strategic random. ASes chosen randomly, but only among
those ASes that have a large enough customer-cone. 4
4Customer cone refers to customers, customers of customers, etc. In other words, a
selected AS must be a significant provider to other ASes.
But while this approach is better than random, it still computes a
separate, large set of ASes for every adversary (858 ASes for China,
835 for Venezuela, etc.).
Further, Kim et al. [9] also suggest a graph theoretic approach to
solve the problem, involving hypothetical network graphs, without
however considering how network routes are determined by inter-
AS relationships [26].
The first contribution of this paper is a new approach for placing
DRs: we select the ASes that appear most frequently in paths from
all ASes to popular websites (potential Overt Destinations), as
candidates for placing DRs – as estimated from actual routing tables.
In our experiments, we target multiple sets of target websites
(globally popular ones, those popular in selected censorious nations,
etc.), and consistently find that the same set of key ASes cover the
vast majority (> 90%) of routes to the target. (Genuine Internet BGP
routes, collected by Routeviews [27], not a simulation.) We suggest
that these “heavy-hitter” ASes are very likely the current “core”
of the Internet, as first found by Rexford et al [2], and are good
candidates for installing DRs as they intercept the vast majority of
flows to any destination.
Our results indicate that 30 ASes suffice to provide Decoy Routing
worldwide (in comparison, the state of the art [1] requires over 850
ASes to contain a single adversary country, China).
A possible objection to our method is that several of the “heavy-
hitter” ASes of the Internet [28] may themselves be adversaries, as
they are hosted in censorious nations [29]. However, in this paper,
we show that only a handful of ASes (≈ 30) are needed to host
Decoy Routers, even when we restrict ourselves from using ASes in
adversary countries such as Russia or China.
Moreover, we correct some incorrect assumptions made by the
earlier authors. Houmansadr [1] use customer-cone size as a metric
to choose ASes, assuming that it is a good predictor of how many
flows they carry; we explain in Section 6 (and in the appendix) why
it is not.
Our second, and more important, contribution is to demonstrate
that even though the number of ASes needed for a DR infrastructure
is small, the actual number of routers that are to be replaced with DRs
is large. We map ASes at the router-level, using Rocketfuel [18],
and identify the specific network elements that potentially need
to be replaced by DRs; on average, for each AS we need to deploy
several hundred DRs. We suggest that the cost of such “major
surgery” effectively removes the possibility that ASes would operate
such a project pro bono, and raises the question of how such an
infrastructure may be economically feasible [12].
2.3 Mapping the Internet
Our work depends on finding the paths to a particular destination
taken by Internet traffic. In this sub-section, we give a short intro-
duction to Internet mapping, and explain our method of mapping.
The Internet consists of routers and hosts, organized into net-
works called Autonomous Systems (ASes). These networks operate
independently, but collaborate to route traffic among themselves.
ASes can be customers, peers, or providers to other ASes; besides
a physical connection, there must be an acceptable business rela-
tionship between two ASes, before they route traffic through each
other.5
Mapping the Internet involves two tasks – Finding inter-AS
connections (and relationships) and mapping routers and hosts
(and their connections, inside ASes).
AS-levelmapping.: Projects such as CAIDAArk [30] and iPlane [31]
map Internet routes with traceroute. Traceroute returns router-
level paths from a source to a destination, hop-by-hop; the map
is built by running traceroute from distributed volunteer nodes to
various /24 prefixes. This data is consolidated into a graph where
the nodes represent ASes, and edges represent links between them.
Such approaches are generally limited by the network locations
and availability of the volunteer nodes; they may not provide the
AS-level path between any two randomly chosen ASes, and even
where they do, they may be inaccurate.
In our research we used the approach of Gao and Qiu [13], that
uses RIBs collected from the Routeviews project [27] and “stitches
together” known links, thus constructing paths to our target sites
from every AS in the Internet. This approach has been used in the
past by others [32, 33]. Details are given in Appendix A.
Router-level mapping: A large AS, such as an ISP, generally has
several thousand routers. In theory, it is possible to repeat our ap-
proach for inter-AS mapping (where we use BGP information), and
map the internal structure of ASes using their SNMP Management
Information Bases (MIBs) [34]. However, we have no access to
this data. Instead, we mapped the routers in ASes of interest using
the Rocketfuel approach [18] (this involves running traceroute
probes from looking glass servers [35] to prefixes inside a chosen
AS). Thereafter, IP aliases6 are resolved using Midar [36].
3 MOTIVATION
The problem in this paper is to determine where in the Internet we
should place DRs, in order to intercept large fraction of network
paths. The current state of the art [1] chooses ASes which are
strongly linked with each target country (therefore intercepting
much of their traffic), and whose customer cone size exceeds some
threshold. However, this approach has the following limitations:
(1) New ASes must be identified for each adversary nation.
(2) This set of ASes is quite large. (over 850 ASes for China,
nearly 850 for Venezuela, etc.)
(3) Customer-cone size does not seem to be an effective metric
for choosing ASes that appear frequently in real routes
(candidates for DR placement)7
(4) A large AS has thousands of routers, spread across several
countries. Current methods identify the ASes to place DRs
in - but not where in the AS they should be placed.
In order to address these limitations, we construct a map of the
Internet, and select the ASes that occur most frequently in our
paths (estimated using real BGP routing tables), instead of any
other metric. Next, we map these ASes to identify their key routers;
5A customer AS routes traffic through its providers; but providers do not route
“through” traffic through their customers. The only traffic a provider sends a cus-
tomer, is meant for that customer, or its customers, and so on.
6Different interfaces of the same router, with different IP addresses, are called IP aliases
7We mention the reasons in Section 6. Details are provided in the Appendix.
this allows us to estimate the number of DRs we need to be able to
intercept a large fraction of Internet traffic.
4 METHODS: DATA COLLECTION AND
ALGORITHM
This section presents our algorithm for identifying key ASes in the
Internet, and key routers in these ASes. Our focus in this section
is on finding ASes and routers that intercept the paths from all
ASes to important destinations (Alexa top-10, top-20 etc.) We also
describe how we verify that our results are more general, i.e. that
our key ASes and routers also intercept paths to other destinations
besides the top-n website. This is covered in more detail in Section
6. Our network mapping process consists of two phases.8
• First, we build an AS-level Internet map, consisting of paths
connecting popular websites and all the ASes of the Inter-
net. We identify ASes that appear most frequently in those
paths as key ASes (for hosting DRs).
• In the second phase, we estimate the router – level topology
of key ASes to identify key routers – the actual routers
inside the ASes that transport the majority of traffic.
4.1 Generating AS level maps
For the first phase of network mapping, we used the approach
presented by Gao et al. [13]. AS paths are collected from BGP paths
at Internet Exchange Points (IXes) [27]. These tables, however, do
not contain paths originating at every AS; Gao et al.’s approach
infers paths originating from every AS, using the existing BGP
paths. ASes are appended to existing paths by selecting those that
most frequently appear adjacent to ASes on the said BGP paths,
without invalidating the path’s valley-free property9. The aim is to
build paths connecting every AS in the Internet to a given IP prefix.
Details of the AS mapping algorithm are presented in Appendix A.
For our analysis, we used snapshots of BGP RIBs collected from
15 vantage points [27]. Our original approach involved choosing
the top-10 most popular sites, finding the paths from all ASes to
their corresponding prefixes, and identifying the most frequently
appearing ASes on these paths.
As presented in Section 5, we found a small set of ASes that
appear in more than 90% of the paths to these popular destinations
from all ASes. We then increased the number of popular destina-
tions – top-10, 30, 50, upto 100 – and estimated the paths to the
corresponding prefixes from all ASes. At each step we identified the
set of ASes which appear most frequently in the paths. As we show
in Section 5, the rough set of ASes remained almost unchanged as
we varied the number of destinations.
These results suggest that the ASes identified were likely “heavy-
hitter” ASes of the Internet, potentially suitable candidates for DRs
placement, as they may intercept a large fraction of network paths,
originating at ASes around the world. As a caveat, we know that
8Our original plan was to map the entire Internet at the router level, and identify
the key routers directly. Unfortunately, no existing techniques scale to mapping the
Internet accurately at such fine granularity.
9The AS-level path between two hosts on the Internet is said to follow a “valley free”
path, as the path first rises - an AS, then its provider, then a provider of the provider,
etc.; peaks - or plateaus, as it crosses through several peering links - and then descends,
through provider-to-customer links, until it reaches the destination. There must be no
no provider-to-customer links between two customer-to-provider links (“valleys”)
the Internet has a hierarchical structure, rooted at a few “core
ASes” which peer with one another and intercept a large fraction
of network routes [2]. But to test this claim, we had to answer two
questions – (a) Was it necessary to select exactly, and all, these
ASes for placing DRs? Some of these ASes were in censorious
countries. (b) How could we validate that our observations, that a
great majority of paths were intercepted by these ASes, were not
limited to the target OD sites we studied?
In order to answer the first question, we investigated the impact
of replacing our key ASes in Russia, China, etc., with the next best
choice: ASes ranked 31-50 by path frequency, but in non-censorious
countries. We found the path coverage remained over 90%.
To answer the second question, we took the key ASes computed
for the top-100 sites (say, Set-A). Next, taking sites ranked 101-200
on Alexa (Set-B), we computed the paths to these sites for all ASes.
We discovered that the key ASes, computed using the paths for Set-A,
continue to intercept over 90% paths for Set-B.
Finally, we also computed the paths corresponding to the 50
most popular websites in each of nine different censorious nations
(say, Set-C). The same key ASes also intercepted over 90% of the
AS-level paths to destinations in Set-C.
Several months after our initial route collection, we repeated our
experiments, and found the same set of key ASes intercepting over
90% of the paths to Set-A, Set-B, and Set-C.
Our approach differs from what was proposed previously [1, 11].
The authors either chose Tier–1 ASes, or those that had large
customer-cone sizes. We show in Section 6, and in the Appen-
dix, that customer-cone size is poorly correlated to the number of
network paths that traverse an AS (path frequency)–the latter being
a better metric to select candidate ASes for DR placement.
We note that Gao et al.’s algorithm generates the request paths
(connecting all ASes to selected IP-prefixes), and not the reply paths
(from the prefixes to the ASes). It is natural to ask whether asymme-
try in routing might impact the strategy for placing DRs. However,
the latest DR architectures, such as TapDance [8], are agnostic to
path symmetricity10. This greatly simplifies the Decoy Router place-
ment problem: we only need to place a DR on the path from the
user to the OD, and not necessarily on the return path.
4.2 Creating router level maps
After identifying key ASes in the Internet, as above, we were still
left with the problem of where in the AS to put DRs. An AS involves
a complex topology of routers and hosts; even the AS administrator,
who knows the internal topology, may not know how frequently
a router appears in actual network paths. When approaching AS
admins to ask them to implement Decoy Routing, it is helpful to
estimate how many (and which) routers they will need to replace.
We therefore identified the actual routers that transport most of
the ASes’ traffic, using Rocketfuel [18] as follows:
• For each chosen AS, we identified the prefixes it adver-
tises (from cidr-report.org). From 390 planetlab nodes,
we targeted Traceroute probes to three representative IP
addresses, corresponding to each prefix; we thus obtain
10Responses from the overt destination are suppressed by manipulating http protocol
states, without requiring the DR’s intervention.
router-level paths terminating at these prefixes. To cap-
ture paths transiting the said AS, we also ran traceroute
probes targeted towards IP prefixes in its neighboring ASes.
• Using Whois [37], we inspected each traceroute paths
to identify the first and last IP address belonging to the
target AS. We denote these as the edge routers of an AS (as
opposed to core routers, i.e. the internal routers of the AS).
We trim the traces down to the part between these edge
routers, i.e. inside the AS.
• The router IPs (belonging to the target AS), discovered
through the above process, suffer from problems such as
aliasing [38], so we resolved these aliases using the state-
of-the-art alias resolution tool Midar [36].
• Finally, from the traceroute results we identified a mini-
mum number of routers which cumulatively intercept over
90% of traceroute paths.When possible, we selected edge
routers (as the edge routers cover 100% of paths through
the AS). But in cases where some heavy-hitter edge and
core routers intercept over 90% of paths, and this set is
smaller than the set of edge routers, we selected those (the
former) instead.
5 DATA AND EVALUATIONS
Figure 2: ASes needed to capture 90% of traffic paths to dif-
ferent sets of overt destinations (popular websites).
5.1 Identification of Key ASes
As described in the previous section, we began by selecting a small
set of globally popular websites (Alexa top-10), computed the AS-
level paths to them, and identified ASes which appeared most fre-
quently in these paths. We recomputed such paths by increasing
the number of popular websites – top-30, 50, 70 and 100. As figure 2
shows, the same number of roughly 30 ASes intercepted over 90%
of the paths to these sites.
For instance, in Figure 3, we show the CDF of the 4, 497, 547
paths connecting the Alexa top-100 sites to all ASes, and their
interception by our top-30 ASes. The X-axis represents the top-30
ASes ranked by their path frequencies; the Y-axis represents the
actual fraction of paths. The highest-ranked AS, AS3356 (Level 3
Communications), intercepts 1, 492, 079 paths (33.2% of all paths).
ASN Country Rank (Pf r eq ) Rank (Cscore )
3356 US 1 1
174 US 2 2
2914 US 3 5
1299 SE 4 4
3257 DE 5 3
6939 US 6 13
6461 US 7 8
6453 US 8 52
7018 US 9 17
10310 US 10 6
4134 CN 11 10
3549 US 12 79
4837 CN 13 85
209 US 14 19
9002 UA 15 97
6762 IT 16 7
8359 RU 17 22
2828 US 18 30
20485 RU 19 21
16509 US 20 9
9498 IN 21 18
4323 US 22 16
3216 RU 23 99
2497 JP 24 15
701 US 25 12
12956 ES 26 65
37100 MU 27 23
4826 AU 28 26
12389 RU 29 67
1335 US 30 92
Table 1: Top 30 ASes that intercept more than 90% of paths.
(ASes headquartered in censor nations are highlighted.)
The top 2 ASes, AS3356 and AS174 (Cogent Communications),
intercept 2, 028, 831(= 1, 492, 079 + 536, 752) unique IP-prefix-to-
AS paths, (45.1% of all paths). The top 30-ASes by path frequency
together intercept 92.4% of all paths.
However, there is a major problem with considering the top-30
ASes as the preferred location for placing Decoy Routers. In Table 1,
which presents the corresponding ASes, their hosting country, and
their ranks based on path frequency (Pf r eq ) and customer-cone
size (Csize ), we highlight this problem: a substantial fraction of
these ASes lie in countries known to censor Internet traffic, such
as Russia and China 11. So the question arises whether we can find
acceptable alternatives.
As we see in Figure 5, while the number of unique paths in-
tercepted falls off rapidly, the total paths intercepted, including
overlaps, does not. This observation emboldens us to suggest that
ASes ranked 31 − 50 are comparable to those ranked 11 − 30 in
terms of the paths they intersect. Accordingly, from the ASes ranked
between 31 − 50, we selected 9 new ASes headquartered in non-
censorious regimes as replacements for the (likely) hostile ASes in
Table 1. These ASes are presented in Table 2.
Figure 4 presents the proportion of paths to Alexa top-100 web-
sites covered by our new set of key ASes (i.e. redefining key AS to
exclude ASes in censorious nations). We see by comparing with
Figure 3, that the chosen set of key ASes are roughly as effective at
intercepting traffic as the top-30 ASes. (To be exact, they intercept
90.2% of the AS-to-prefix paths, compared to 92.4% for the top-30.)
In fact, they do so consistently, for all target prefixes in our tests.
11As per censorship ratings by Freedom House Report [39] and the ONI [40].
ASN Country Rank (Pf r eq ) Rank (Cscore )
13030 SW 31 84
1273 UK 32 83
16735 BZ 33 98
6830 EU 34 91
18881 BZ 35 95
3491 US 36 42
10026 HK 37 87
32787 US 39 93
1239 US 46 45
Table 2: ASes hosted in non-censorious nations ranked by
path frequency (ranks >30 and <50)
Figure 3: CDF: ASes and the fraction of paths they intercept.
(CDFs are for paths to Alexa top-100 websites).
Figure 4: CDF of ASes (hosted in non-censorious ASes) ac-
cording to fraction of paths that they intercept.
5.2 Identifying important routers inside key
ASes
The second part of our research involves identifying the impor-
tant routers inside key ASes. As described in Section 4.1, we used
Traceroute to probe IPs in each prefix advertised by the key ASes.
From these traces we determined the candidate routers that may
be replaced with DRs.
Figure 5: No. of paths intercepted by each of the top-50 ASes
(sorted by path frequency).
We originally chose to näively replace edge routers with DRs,
as these intercept all traffic entering and leaving an AS. However,
we found that in many cases the total number of edge routers is
significantly greater than the number of “heavy-hitter” routers – a
set of edge and core routers that collectively appear in more than
90% of the traceroute paths for the AS. We therefore updated our
approach. For each AS, we now find both sets (edge routers and
heavy-hitter routers), and select the smaller set as the key routers,
i.e. the candidates for being replaced with DRs. For example, for AS
4134, we need only 179 heavy-hitter routers (including both edge
and core routers) to capture over 90% of the paths, but 749 edge
routers to intercept 100% paths, while for AS209 (Quest Communi-
cations), we choose the edge router set – about 1662 routers. We
present our results in Table 3.
As mentioned previously, several of these ASes are hosted in
censorious regimes, and so we identified the number of routers
to be replaced with DRs in non-censorious countries. While the
results presented in table 3 represents the number of routers to
be replaced for ASes presented in Table 1, Table 4 represent the
number of routers for ASes in non-censorious nations presented in
Table 2.
The total number of routers that may be replaced across ASes in
non-censorious ASes is 11, 709.
The 11, 709 key routers, across 30 key ASes that together in-
tercept greater than 90% of network paths, together represent a
formidable infrastructure, with equipment costs of 10.3 billion dol-
lars. Converting these routers to DRs would involve massive system
implementation, testing, deployment and related costs.
Implementation Details: Our AS-level map uses BGP Routing
Information Base (RIB) data, which we obtain from 15 Internet
Exchange points through routeviews [27], and AS relationship data
from CAIDA [14]. The map was constructed using virtual machines
with a total of 10 CPU cores (x64) and 24 GB RAM, running Ubuntu
Linux (14.04LTS server). Our multi-threaded implementation of
Gao’s [13] algorithm took ≈ 3-4 hrs. to compute paths to 10 prefixes.
To identify key routers in an AS, we ran traceroute probes
from 390 planetlab machines to three random IP’s in each prefix
advertised by the AS. Depending upon the number of prefixes
advertised, and network latency, it took approximately 18 − 36
hours to probe an AS, and 5 − 8 hours for alias resolution.
ASN # of # of # of # of
Edge Core Heavy DR’s
Routers Routers Hitter Required
(E) (C) Routers min(E, H)
(H)
3356 707 303 576 576
174 165 1572 288 165
2914 134 2061 534 134
1299 493 1989 517 493
3257 762 2316 1483 762
6939 169 554 103 103
6461 105 850 45 45
6453 223 896 210 210
7018 359 6003 107 107
10310 161 156 106 106
4134 749 10078 177 177
3549 943 6227 5579 943
4837 1031 7350 2538 1031
209 1662 10842 8687 1662
9002 30 47 40 30
6762 154 333 238 154
8359 25 320 13 13
2828 116 1049 636 116
20485 506 206 193 193
16509 1244 5311 4644 1244
9498 320 199 269 269
4323 668 2548 2695 668
3216 305 1981 1769 305
2497 187 1078 133 133
701 1770 4417 2975 1770
12956 482 734 681 482
37100 14 72 59 14
4826 43 381 30 30
12389 322 2625 1898 322
Table 3: Edge routers, core routers, heavy-hitter routers
and the routers required for replacement with DRs. Apply-
ing our router selection strategy, for e.g. for AS3356 – edge
routers: 707 core routers: 303. Routers (both edge and core)
covering 90% of the paths: 576. We thus select the latter. Total
routers required for all the 30 ASes (headquartered in censo-
rious and non-censorious nations) : 12, 257.
ASN # of # of # of # of
Edge Core Heavy DR’s
Routers Routers Hitter Required
(E) (C) Routers min(E,H)
(H)
13030 58 302 38 38
1273 156 1106 693 156
16735 12 43 37 12
6830 216 4048 1654 216
18881 338 3893 431 338
3491 698 1139 955 698
10026 170 765 346 170
32787 46 571 456 46
1239 242 1221 910 242
Table 4: Edge routers, core routers, heavy-hitters, and re-
quired DRs, for our “replacement” key ASes (from Table 2).
6 DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
Our method for placement of DRs, as presented in this paper, has
several major advantages:
(1) The placement of DRs is global, and needs to be run only
once to provide a small list of ASes that cover paths from
all adversaries. (Existing approaches [1] require fresh can-
didate ASes to place DRs for each adversary nation.)
(2) The ASes selected are located far away from the adversary
nations, and thus outside their geo-political and economic
sphere of control. This makes it more difficult to bring
pressure to bear on them.
(3) The selected ASes lie on a very large fraction of paths.
It is therefore hard for RAD adversaries [11] to bypass
them without risking disconnection from all or most of the
Internet. (This might inadvertently also disconnect foreign
customers, as we see in sub-section 6.2 .)
Onemay ask whywe only consider paths to the 100most popular
websites - what about paths to other IP prefixes? In this section,
we explore such concerns, focusing on questions such as:
• Do our key ASes also intercept an equally large fraction of
paths to other unrelated sites (e.g. less popular ones) ?
• A particular set of users may consider completely different
sites “popular” (for e.g., users in some countries may only
be interested in sites available in their language). Do our
key ASes effectively cover paths to such sites?
• How important are the key ASes to actual censorious na-
tions? If such nations chose to filter paths traversing these
key ASes, how would it impact their downstream (foreign)
customers?
Finally, we discuss the limitations of our method, and our plans
for future work.
6.1 How general are our results?
Our data shows that a small fraction of ASes (≈ 30) cumulatively
intercept over 90% of the total paths to popular web destinations
(Alexa top 10, 20 ... 200)12. The question naturally follows whether
these ASes are specific to the websites chosen for our study, or they
intercept a similarly large fraction of all traffic on the Internet.
From Rexford’s study of Internet structure [28], it is reasonable
to deduce that there is indeed a small set of ASes - core ASes of the
Internet - that cover a majority of routes of the Internet in general.
So our task becomes, gathering evidence to show that our 30 key
ASes intercept a large fraction of paths leading to various other
destinations also.
To begin with, we estimated AS paths to Set B, the set of sites
globally ranked 101–200 by Alexa. As Figure 6 shows, the 30 key
ASes identified using paths to Set A, intercepted over 90% of the
paths to Set B as well. The same pattern also holds for Set C - sites
popular in censorious countries - discussed in the next sub-section.
12There is a third small caveat: Key ASes cover only more than 90%, and not 100% of
the paths. But from Houmansadr [1], we know that it is not feasible for a country to
launch a RAD attack and avoid 90% of paths. The only practical significance is that
a user may not get a DR on their first attempt; but if a user probes for a DR, with
greater than 99.9% probability she will succeed in three attempts (compared to the 30
attempts needed for earlier designs [6]), so this is not a major concern.
Figure 6: CDF of ASes according to fraction of paths they
intercept (for Alexa top-101 to 200 websites).
Finally, we repeated the entire experiment after a gap of four
months. We again found the same 30 ASes intercepting over 90%
of the paths (see Figure 14 in Appendix).
6.2 How important are the key ASes to actual
adversarial nations?
In order to answer this question, we began by measuring how
well key ASes cover paths from individual adversary nations to
globally important destinations. Our results, showing the fraction
of paths disconnected across 11 censorious nations, are presented in
Figure 7. The horizontal axis has country names (as 2-letter initials);
the vertical axis, the fraction of the paths covered by our key ASes.
We see that, for example, our 30 key ASes cover 98.8% of paths
from Chinese ASes to globally popular destinations, and at least
80% for nearly all adversary countries.
Figure 7: Eleven Censorious Nations: fractions of paths (to
major websites) dependent on our 30 key ASes.
However, while these figures are encouraging, they are not
enough. For some nations (e.g. Iran, China), it might be argued that
the loss of paths to globally important sites simply does not matter,
as they have their own homegrown substitutes (e.g. facenama.com
and renren.com respectively for facebook.com).
In response to this concern, we investigated the popular web
destinations in censorious countries. As per Alexa [41], we find
that these include not only local websites, but also several of the
top-100 globally popular sites (search engines, social-media sites,
cloud services, e-commerce sites etc.). In other words, while the
choice of websites does vary across nations (e.g. based on user’s
choice of language), web access is not as “insular” as one may fear.
For each of nine adversary countries studied by Verkamp [42] -
China, Venezuela, Russia, Syria, Bahrain, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia,
Egypt and Iran - we identified our Set C, consisting of the top 50
websites popular in each of these countries (and hosted outside
their respective networks). Shown in Figure 8, our 30 key ASes
intercept 93.3% of the paths originating or transiting these countries
and leading to the sites in Set C.
Figure 8: CDF of ASes according to fraction of paths inter-
cepted (for websites popular in censorious nations).
In considering that different paths originate in and transit through
a country, we further realized that avoiding key ASes might be
expensive for a country in more ways than one – collateral damage.
Collateral damage: Collateral damage results when an AS filters
sites, and also causes its customers to lose access [43]. If, for exam-
ple, China was to boycott the paths routed through our chosen key
ASes, Chinese people would lose access to much of the Internet
(and certainly to most popular websites); but so would customers
of Chinese ASes. It becomes a valid question to ask, how many
customers are affected?
To answer this question, we inspected the paths through and
from nine censorious countries. Figure 9 shows the percentage of
paths transiting censorious nations that originate at foreign ASes.
We see that in the case of China, for example, filtering traffic
through key ASes would affect a very large number of customers,
over whom Chinese censorship policies have no control. 306, 874
AS paths, out of a total of 332, 742 paths involving Chinese ASes
and leading to popular destinations - i.e. 92.25% - originate at ASes
outside China13. In fact, our data suggests that collateral damage to
customers might be a way to put pressure on several censorious
countries; we will explore this in future.
13362 particularly interesting paths originated at a Chinese AS, passed through non-
Chinese ASes, then re-entered China and passed through Chinese ASes, before finally
leaving for their destination.
Figure 9: Collateral Damage: Percentage of paths transiting
censorious nations that originate at foreign ASes.
6.3 Might a different solution do better?
The macroscopic analysis (of AS level topology) gives an impression
that DR infrastructure is feasible, but the “devil in the details” is that
the microscopic view (at router level) shows that we would need to
convert thousands of routers into DRs. It is natural to ask whether
this conclusion is just an artifact of our method, and whether an
alternative approach might find a cheaper solution.
Our approach is not provably optimal. Indeed, we could get by
with a smaller number of routers if we placed the DRs to intercept all
traffic at a few, fixed overt destinations (e.g. Google). However, such
a solution is fragile: the censor could simply filter traffic to these
overt destinations. Our method of placing DRs uses far fewer ASes
than any known comparable methods [1], and intercepts traffic
to potential overt destinations (sites that are popular globally and
also in censorious nations – for whom it matters most). Seeing
how placing DRs in even our modest number of ASes is a major
undertaking, we conclude that there is no “silver bullet” – robust
DR deployment is feasible, but implementing it is a serious challenge.
6.4 Is it easier to cover single countries?
Our solution involves a single set of ASes that can serve as a DR
framework for the overwhelming majority of traffic globally. We
show that a global DR infrastructure is complex and likely expen-
sive; but might it be feasible to target single censor countries?
We find that in case of major adversaries like China, the best
solution is to use the same 30 ASes that we would use for a world-
wide DR system. In case of some minor countries such as Syria
(which has 2 ASes), Sorted Ring placement [1] does allow a simpler
solution: we identified 3 ASes which intercept all Syrian AS level
paths. But the router level maps of these ASes suggest that, even
for Syria, we need 1, 117 DRs in 3 different ASes.
Our conclusion is that targeting a DR infrastructure to single
countries is difficult even against relatively weak adversaries, and
the best solution against strong adversaries (our solution in this
paper) is more expensive still.
6.5 How economically feasible is Decoy
Routing?
Our results show that a comprehensive DR infrastructure would
span about 30 ASes across ten countries, and require massive incen-
tives. The question immediately arises whether existing business
models for Decoy Routing [12], i.e. central deployment (where a sin-
gle organization pays individual AS operators to deploy DRs) and
autonomous deployment (where ASes individually deploy DRs and
bill their users for usage), can reasonably provide such incentives.
In the case of central deployment, we note that unlike, for in-
stance, Tor, this project will depend on large-scale corporate partic-
ipation. Tor is a globally distributed volunteer network, involving
participants running the open-source Tor software on their (per-
sonal) end-hosts; the actual funding for the project only needs to
support the developers, maintainers and some minimal infrastruc-
ture (Directory Authority servers, etc.) A worldwide DR framework
needs to incentivize multiple multi-billion dollar companies to co-
operate, and it is disturbingly likely that a single player who pays
such incentives - whether a major company or a government - is
motivated by its own agenda, rather than benevolence.
Autonomous deployment suffers from an evenmore serious issue.
Decoy Routing obfuscates public knowledge of the deployment
infrastructure (physical location and hosting network); but such
obfuscation also makes it difficult for users to target payment. Any
Internet based payment scheme would reveal the identities of DR
hosting ASes to the clients, and in time, to their censorious ISPs.
The adversary now simply blocks such Internet based payment
transactions in order to prevent users from getting DR service;
the whole “robust infrastructure that cannot be routed around” is
rendered moot.
We therefore conclude that a practical DR infrastructure faces
substantial challenges, and would likely only be possible with major
support from one or more powerful nations.
6.6 Methods, Limitations, and Future Work.
This sub-section is devoted to the choices we made, w.r.t. the design
of our methods of network mapping. We explain our choices, their
limitations, and how we propose to go forward in future.
Choice of AS: The first major question in our study, was how
to choose key ASes. It may be argued that we could simply have
chosen Tier-1 ASes – i.e. ASes that have no provider – or ASes
with the largest customer cone size (The customers, customers of
customers, etc. of an AS are said to form its “customer cone”.), based
on publicly available data [14], as proposed earlier [1]. Why pick
key ASes by path frequency? It turns out that there is indeed a good
reason for directly choosing ASes by path frequency, i.e. by how
many of the paths they intercept.
A substantial fraction of AS paths traverse the customers of “root”
ASes(i.e., those with very large customer cones) without traversing
the root ASes themselves. For e.g., the traffic through AS9002 to
AS2818 (www.bbc.co.uk) does not pass through AS3356, though it
is the provider to both these ASes (see Figure 10).
Unsurprisingly, 34.16% of the paths to top-100 IP-prefixes tra-
verse the AS with the largest customer cone, AS3356 (cone size
= 24, 553). But nearly as many paths, 33.17%, pass through its 1-
hop (immediate) customers, and not AS3356. In the Appendix, we
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Figure 10: Valley free paths in the cone of AS3356. Green
line: network path traversing AS3356 to reach AS2818 di-
rectly. Red lines: network path through one-hop customers
of AS3356, but not AS3356 itself.
present more such figures (Table 5), and show that Spearman’s Rank
Correlation coefficient [44] between AS ranks by path frequency
and by cone size is only 0.2. Given the considerable fraction of paths
which do not transit root ASes with large cone sizes (preferring
to transit through their customer ASes instead), we conclude that
customer-cone size is not a good parameter to choose key ASes.
AS path estimation: The twomainmethods of estimating an inter-
AS topology are: (a) using traceroute traces (as in CAIDA Ark)
(b) using BGP routing tables. Traceroute data, being constrained by
the location of available probing nodes, is not sufficiently rich to
estimate the actual path of traffic from every AS to a given prefix.
Hence we choose the routing-table approach.
Previous efforts use simulated BGP paths [1], or paths derived
from a Breadth-First traversal of inter-AS links [28]. We improve
upon this by employing Gao’s algorithm with real BGP tables (col-
lected from various Internet Exchanges [27]), thereby estimating
the actual paths from a chosen IP prefix to all ASes (at a given point
of time).
Of course, our map is still not perfect. As Gregori et al. [45, 46]
show, publicly-available routing tables have biases, errors and bogus
route advertisements. In order to address such issues, in future, we
may cross-validate our map with different sources of data (and
mapping algorithms).
Router level topology estimation: Router-level mapping of AS
structure, uses traceroute probes from various planetlab hosts
to IP addresses inside the ASes. We are limited by the fraction
of routers discoverable through traceroute probes, and routers
and middleboxes are sometimes set up to not respond to ping and
traceroute. To limit this concern as far as possible, we use Paris
Traceroute, with TCP probes. Secondly, we used planetlab nodes
to launch traceroute probes, as the looking-glass servers (as
used originally [18]) were unavailable at the time of our tests. There
is always a chance some routes are simply not covered; increasing
the number of probing hosts may improve our topology estimation,
as new paths may be discovered by probing an IP address from
different vantage points.
7 CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we have made two contributions towards answering
the question of how to best place DRs in the Internet.
(1) As our first contribution, we demonstrate that a small set
of candidate ASes (≈ 30) intercepts a very large fraction of
paths (greater than 90%) to sites of interest, i.e. potential
overt destinations, irrespective of the adversary country. In
other words, placing DRs in our ASes is sufficient to build
a global DR framework. (As opposed to current approaches
[1, 12], which need the collaboration of over 800 ASes for
a single adversary such as Venezuela or China.). We also
observe that, if censorious regimes (like China) attempt to
filter traffic along the paths transiting our 30ASes, theywill
not only censor their own citizens, but many other residing
outside their network boundaries (collateral damage).
(2) Our second contribution is to explore the question of DR
placement, not only at the AS-level, but at the router level.
In practice, an AS is not a simple entity; it may have thou-
sands of routers, and it is not obvious which of these should
be replaced with DR. We find that, to intercept a large frac-
tion of paths through an AS, we need a large number of
both edge and core routers - typically several hundred (and
in cases such as Quest Communications and Verizon, well
over 1500 routers).
Thus, setting up a worldwide DR framework may require the
collaboration of a small set of ASes (≈ 30). But even a single key AS,
on an average, will need several hundred routers to intercept all the
paths. We conclude that building a worldwide DR infrastructure is
practically feasible, but ASes need sufficiently strong incentives to
deploy a total of over 11, 700 DRs. We will explore such issues, in
our future work.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
We would like to express thanks to Mr. Rahul Singh, M.Tech IIITD,
who helped us develop our first prototype of Gao et al.’s ASmapping
algorithm. We are also grateful to Persistent Systems Ltd., India,
who very kindly agreed to fund our travel to the conference to
present the paper.
REFERENCES
[1] A. Houmansadr, E. L. Wong, and V. Shmatikov, “No direction home: The true
cost of routing around decoys.” in NDSS, 2014.
[2] L. Subramanian, S. Agarwal, J. Rexford, and R. H. Katz, “Characterizing the
internet hierarchy from multiple vantage points,” in INFOCOM 2002. Twenty-First
Annual Joint Conference of the IEEE Computer and Communications Societies.
Proceedings. IEEE, vol. 2. IEEE, 2002, pp. 618–627.
[3] R. Dingledine, N. Mathewson, and P. Syverson, “Tor: The second-generation
onion router,” DTIC Document, Tech. Rep., 2004.
[4] P. Winter and S. Lindskog, “How the great firewall of china is blocking tor.” in
FOCI, 2012.
[5] J. Karlin, D. Ellard, A. W. Jackson, C. E. Jones, G. Lauer, D. Mankins, and W. T.
Strayer, “Decoy routing: Toward unblockable internet communication.” in FOCI,
2011.
[6] A. Houmansadr, G. T. Nguyen, M. Caesar, and N. Borisov, “Cirripede: Circum-
vention infrastructure using router redirection with plausible deniability,” in
Proceedings of the 18th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Secu-
rity, ser. CCS ’11. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2011, pp. 187–200.
[7] E. Wustrow, S. Wolchok, I. Goldberg, and J. A. Halderman, “Telex: Anticensorship
in the network infrastructure.” in USENIX Security Symposium, 2011.
[8] E. Wustrow, C. M. Swanson, and J. A. Halderman, “Tapdance: End-to-middle
anticensorship without flow blocking,” in 23rd USENIX Security Symposium
(USENIX Security 14), 2014, pp. 159–174.
[9] D. Ellard, C. Jones, V. Manfredi, W. T. Strayer, B. Thapa, M. V. Welie, and A. Jack-
son, “Rebound: Decoy routing on asymmetric routes via error messages,” in Local
Computer Networks (LCN), 2015 IEEE 40th Conference on, Oct 2015, pp. 91–99.
[10] C. Bocovich and I. Goldberg, “Slitheen: Perfectly imitated decoy routing through
traffic replacement,” in Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Com-
puter and Communications Security. ACM, 2016, pp. 1702–1714.
[11] M. Schuchard, J. Geddes, C. Thompson, and N. Hopper, “Routing around decoys,”
in Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer and communications
security. ACM, 2012, pp. 85–96.
[12] M. Nasr and A. Houmansadr, “Game of decoys: Optimal decoy routing through
game theory,” in Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer
and Communications Security, ser. CCS ’16. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2016,
pp. 1727–1738.
[13] J. Qiu and L. Gao, “As path inference by exploiting known as paths,” in Global
Telecommunications Conference, 2006. GLOBECOM’06. IEEE. IEEE, 2006, pp. 1–5.
[14] “As relationships,” http://www.caida.org/data/as-relationships/.
[15] N. Hu and P. Steenkiste, “Exploiting internet route sharing for large scale avail-
able bandwidth estimation,” in Proceedings of the 5th ACM SIGCOMM conference
on Internet Measurement. USENIX Association, 2005, pp. 16–16.
[16] D. Magoni and M. Hoerdt, “Internet core topology mapping and analysis,” Com-
puter Communications, vol. 28, no. 5, pp. 494–506, 2005.
[17] C. Orsini, E. Gregori, L. Lenzini, and D. Krioukov, “Evolution of the internet
k-dense structure,” IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON), vol. 22, no. 6,
pp. 1769–1780, 2014.
[18] N. Spring, R. Mahajan, D. Wetherall, and T. Anderson, “Measuring isp topologies
with rocketfuel,” IEEE/ACM Trans. Netw., vol. 12, no. 1, pp. 2–16, Feb. 2004.
[19] H. J. Chao and B. Liu, High performance switches and routers. John Wiley &
Sons, 2007.
[20] S. Das, G. Parulkar, and N. McKeown, “Rethinking ip core networks,” Journal of
Optical Communications and Networking, vol. 5, no. 12, pp. 1431–1442, 2013.
[21] A. Chaabane, P. Manils, and M. A. Kaafar, “Digging into anonymous traffic: A
deep analysis of the tor anonymizing network,” in Network and System Security
(NSS), 2010 4th International Conference on. IEEE, 2010, pp. 167–174.
[22] S. Dharmapurikar, P. Krishnamurthy, T. Sproull, and J. Lockwood, “Deep packet
inspection using parallel bloom filters,” in High performance interconnects, 2003.
proceedings. 11th symposium on. IEEE, 2003, pp. 44–51.
[23] H. M. Moghaddam, B. Li, M. Derakhshani, and I. Goldberg, “Skypemorph: Proto-
col obfuscation for Tor bridges,” in Proceedings of the 19th ACM conference on
Computer and Communications Security (CCS 2012), October 2012.
[24] Z. Weinberg, J. Wang, V. Yegneswaran, L. Briesemeister, S. Cheung, F. Wang,
and D. Boneh, “StegoTorus: A camouflage proxy for the Tor anonymity system,”
in Proceedings of the 19th ACM conference on Computer and Communications
Security (CCS 2012), October 2012.
[25] A. Houmansadr, C. Brubaker, and V. Shmatikov, “The parrot is dead: Observ-
ing unobservable network communications,” in Proceedings of the 2013 IEEE
Symposium on Security and Privacy, May 2013.
[26] L. Gao, “On inferring autonomous system relationships in the internet,”
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (ToN), vol. 9, no. 6, pp. 733–745, 2001.
[27] “Route views project,” http://archive.routeviews.org/.
[28] J. Cesareo, J. Karlin, J. Rexford, and M. Schapira, “Optimizing the placement of
implicit proxies,” https://www.cs.princeton.edu/~jrex/papers/decoy-routing.pdf,
2012.
[29] H. B. Acharya, S. Chakravarty, and D. Gosain, “Few throats to choke: On the
current structure of the internet,” in Local Computer Networks, 2017.
[30] “Archipelago (ark) measurement infrastructure,” http://www.caida.org/projects/
ark/.
[31] H. V. Madhyastha, T. Isdal, M. Piatek, C. Dixon, T. Anderson, A. Krishnamurthy,
and A. Venkataramani, “iplane: An information plane for distributed services,” in
Proceedings of the 7th symposium on Operating systems design and implementation.
USENIX Association, 2006, pp. 367–380.
[32] A. Barton and M. Wright, “Denasa: Destination-naive as-awareness in anony-
mous communications,” in Proceedings of the 16th Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Symposium (PETS 2016), July 2016.
[33] M. Edman and P. F. Syverson, “AS-awareness in Tor path selection,” in Proceedings
of the 2009 ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS 2009,
E. Al-Shaer, S. Jha, and A. D. Keromytis, Eds. ACM, November 2009, pp. 380–389.
[34] S. Pandey, M.-J. Choi, S.-J. Lee, and J. W. Hong, “Ip network topology discovery
using snmp,” in Proceedings of the 23rd International Conference on Information
Networking, ser. ICOIN’09. Piscataway, NJ, USA: IEEE Press, 2009, pp. 33–37.
[35] “Traceroute Looking Glass,” http://traceroute.org/.
[36] “Midar,” http://www.caida.org/tools/measurement/midar/.
[37] “Ip to asn mapping,” http://www.team-cymru.org/IP-ASN-mapping.html.
[38] H. Haddadi, M. Rio, G. Iannaccone, A.Moore, and R.Mortier, “Network topologies:
inference, modeling, and generation,” IEEE Communications Surveys Tutorials,
vol. 10, no. 2, pp. 48–69, Second 2008.
[39] “Freedom house - freedom of press,” https://freedomhouse.org/.
[40] “Open net initiative,” https://opennet.net/.
[41] “Alexa - actionable analytics for the web,” http://www.alexa.com/topsites.
[42] “Inferring mechanics of web censorship around the world,” in Presented as part
of the 2nd USENIX Workshop on Free and Open Communications on the Internet,
Berkeley, CA, 2012.
[43] Anonymous, “The collateral damage of internet censorship by dns injection,”
SIGCOMM Comput. Commun. Rev., vol. 42, no. 3, pp. 21–27, Jun. 2012.
[44] T. D. Gautheir, “Detecting trends using spearman’s rank correlation coefficient,”
Environmental forensics, vol. 2, no. 4, pp. 359–362, 2001.
[45] E. Gregori, A. Improta, and L. Sani, “Isolario: a do-ut-des approach to improve
the appeal of bgp route collecting,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1611.06904, 2016.
[46] E. Gregori, A. Improta, L. Lenzini, L. Rossi, and L. Sani, “A novel methodology to
address the internet as-level data incompleteness,” IEEE/ACM Transactions on
Networking (TON), vol. 23, no. 4, pp. 1314–1327, 2015.
A GAO AS-LEVEL MAPPING:
Our end-to-end AS-level path inference algorithm follows Gao [13]. The key
idea of this approach is to construct paths based on the routing information
in existing BGP routing tables. More precisely, the process estimates paths
from an IP-prefix to every other AS of the Internet.
The inputs to the algorithm are existing BGP RIBs, collected by the
RouteViews project [27] from Internet Exchange Points (IXes), where several
ASes peer.
Paths directly obtained from RIBs are termed sure paths. ASes on sure
paths are called Base ASes. For example, in the (hypothetical) path 2869 −
3586 − 49561 − 58556 − 10348 192.168.1.12/24, each number represents an
AS. The path originates at AS2869 and terminates at AS10348, the home
AS of the advertised prefix 192.168.1.12/24. Note that the suffixes of sure
paths are themselves also sure paths.
In addition to sure paths, the algorithm computes new ones. This is done
by extending sure paths to other ASes to which there are no explicitly-
known paths (from the prefix concerned). The extended path must be loop-
free, and must satisfy the Valley-Free Property [26]. The process is as follows.
• For each prefix, all sure paths (containing all the base ASes) are
selected. (These are simply the RIB entries corresponding to the
input prefix).
Next, these sure paths are to be inspected for possible extension
to new ASes, provided they they satisfy the Valley Free property
and have no loops.
• The algorithm searches for ASes in existing RIBs that share valid
business relations with the end ASes of paths. [We used the rela-
tionships presented by CAIDA [14].]
• An edge is assumed, to extend a sure path by one hop.
Note that we are trying to find a path from an AS to the target
prefix, and that extensions of several sure paths might connect
the chosen AS to the prefix. Hence there is a need for tie breaking.
– The algorithm sorts the possible paths, and selects the short-
est path to the prefix.
– In case of a tie, the path with minimum uncertainty (length
of the inferred path extensions) is chosen.
– If there is still a tie, the path with the higher frequency index
(the number of times a sure path actually appears in the RIBs)
is selected.
• Appropriate data structures, i.e. the frequency with which an edge
appears in the RIBs, the uncertainty of the extended path, and the
new path length, are updated.
Figure 11: Schematic AS graph with multiple valid valley-
free paths:D−B−E,D−B−C−F ,D−B−C−G,D−B−A−C−F ,
D − B − A − C − G, E − B − A − C − F and E − B − A − C − G.
Note how some do not traverse A, the AS with the highest
customer-cone size.
B PATH FREQUENCY VS CUSTOMER-CONE
SIZE
We provide some detail for our claim in Section 6.4, that customer-cone size
is not a reliable metric to identify the ASes that transport a large fraction
of traffic. We explain our reasoning with the example of the AS graph in
Figure 11.
The figure represents a hypothetical AS graph where node A represents
an AS with the highest customer-cone size of 6, the total number of ASes
that A can reach via its customers and their customers (D, B, E, F , C, G).
ASes B and C have customer cones of size 2 (for each of the individual
nodes).
There are several valid valley free paths in this hypothetical AS graph:
D−B−E ,D−B−C−F ,D−B−C−G ,D−B−A−C−F ,D−B−A−C−G ,
E − B − A −C − F and E − B − A −C −G . However, as evident from the
example, not all of them pass through the root AS, i.e. the node with the
highest customer-cone size. This is also evident from Table 5: for several
large ASes, a considerable fraction of paths do not traverse the core ASes
themselves, but do traverse their immediate (1-hop) customers 14.
14Interestingly, smaller customer-cones have fewer such paths, i.e. paths not traversing
the root AS. Perhaps smaller cones have fewer neighbor ASes to route through? We
may study this in future work
ASN % of path % of path
not reaching reaching
the AS the AS
3356 34.16 33.17
174 29.05 13.13
2914 28.16 12.90
1299 36.50 8.05
3257 21.00 5.23
6939 7.46 4.40
6461 5.13 4.03
6453 26.00 3.76
7018 7.40 3.70
10310 0.07 3.52
Table 5: Prefix-to-AS paths in cone of coreASes: %age travers-
ing core ASes themselves, vs. %age traversing their immedi-
ate (1-hop) customers.
In fact, customer cone size is not evenwell correlatedwith path frequency.
The Spearman’s Rank Correlation Coefficient is only ≈ 0.2 (see Figure 12).
Figure 12: AS Rank variation: path frequency vs cone size
for transit ASes.
C ADDITIONAL GRAPHS
Traffic to specific destinations:
Figure 13: CDF of ASes according to fraction of paths to pop-
ular websites that they intercept
For completeness, we present the results of our experiment for a few of
the most important single websites in isolation, in Figure 13.
Clearly, while single websites are far more variable, the general trend is
similar to Figure 3. About 15ASes (out of the 50 heavy-hitter ASes identified)
cover over 80% of the AS-paths to these destinations.
Figure 14: CDF of ASes by fraction of paths that they inter-
cept (for Alexa top-200 sites)
Only 5 ASes collectively transport all the paths to the prefix correspond-
ing to twitter.com, while about 18 ASes intercept all paths carrying traffic
from bing.com. Finally, about 30 ASes cumulatively transport about 98% of
the paths corresponding to google.com and facebook.com.
For comparison, here is the cumulative frequency of the paths intercepted
by ASes, this time for paths to the Alexa top-200 sites.
We also provide the graph of the cumulative path coverage inside an AS,
by its heavy hitter routers. As is quite clear, the graph varies a good deal;
some ASes are almost completely covered by a few routers, while others
(AS 3257) need very many heavy-hitters, and can more easily be covered by
choosing their edge routers (Figure 15).
Figure 15: Traceroute paths in the top five (out of 30) key
ASes. Thenumber of routers needed to cover 90% of the paths
varies between 288 (AS174) and 1483 (AS3257)
